星空传媒

Since the conclusion of the Minsk II agreement in February 2015, the situation in eastern Ukraine has evolved into a seemingly permanent yet highly volatile state of 鈥渘o peace, no war.鈥� Set in the context of more fractious relations between Russia and the West, more entrenched divisions in Ukraine, and almost , the conflict could yet again spiral out of control and prompt a resumption of high-intensity fighting in Ukraine or full-fledged military with Russia.

As in other post-Soviet conflicts to which it is often compared, such as those in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria, the conflict in the Donbas pits the government in Kyiv against separatist rebels, with the former enjoying Western support while the latter are backed by Russia. Joined at the hip to their external partners, they are locked in a zero-sum game in which Minsk II has become unimplementable, and the continuing nonimplementation justifies each side鈥檚 uncompromising stance. Expecting more violent confrontation in the future, the parties to the conflict use the 鈥渘o peace, no war鈥� situation to try to consolidate their military positions while increasing their institutional and ideological hold on the territory they control.

Key to this has been a surge in military expenditures and production. According to official data, Ukraine鈥檚 military expenses grew to 5 percent of GDP in 2018, and the Ukrainian army鈥檚 troop strength has to 250,000. Matching those actions, the self-declared republics have also military production and enlarged their fighting forces, in part through conscription into the 鈥渞epublican鈥� armed forces.

The 鈥渘o peace, no war situation鈥� has driven a consolidation of positions in nonmilitary spheres as well. For Ukraine, it is critically important to strengthen state institutions and firm up its alliances with its Western partners. As one of the experts whom we suggested, 鈥淭he reintegration of Donbas under Ukraine鈥檚 current weak institutions would likely lead to further disintegration of the country.鈥�

For Russia, the challenges are similar. The status quo guarantees that the Kremlin has at least some degree of control over parts of Ukraine and prevents the country as a whole from drifting completely into the orbit of the West. This control, in turn, facilitates a certain 鈥渟tate-building鈥� in the breakaway republics and the strengthening of links with Russia. The Russian writer , one of the ideologues of the Russian World (Russkiy mir) concept, explained the underlying logic of this: 鈥淭he DPR and LPR are a trap through which Russia keeps Ukraine in its orbit. If we tear out the DPR and LPR, Ukraine will drift in another direction . . . and we will not [be] able to keep it under our influence.鈥� Russian control, whether directly exercised over the breakaway republics or indirectly through them over Kyiv, is a central part of this geopolitical strategy.

The 鈥渘o peace, no war situation鈥� in eastern Ukraine thus has important implications, first and foremost for the national security of Ukraine. Short of further military escalation, the utility of the conflict in the Donbas as a lever that Russia can use to destabilize Ukraine has significantly decreased as a result of Kyiv鈥檚 policy of complete isolation of the rebel-controlled territories and minimizing their influence on the political and socioeconomic life of the rest of Ukraine. This has also created important breathing space for reformers in Kyiv to strengthen domestic institutions, reaffirm their pro-Western geopolitical orientation, and build up links with key allies, such as NATO and the EU.

The unavoidable flip side of isolation, however, is that it contributes to the alienation of people living in Donetsk and Luhansk from 鈥渕ainland鈥� Ukraine and vice versa, thereby magnifying the difficulties of any future reintegration. The downside of isolation is further compounded by the void left in the wake of Kyiv鈥檚 decision to cut off any interaction with the separatist areas: in the absence of any alternative, people and elites in the self-declared republics will become even more dependent on Russia, a trajectory reinforced by the disruption of economic ties with the rest of Ukraine and the restricted mobility of people into and out of the self-declared republics. In other words, reintegration becomes both less likely and more costly.

This domestic logic of no peace, no war locks Russia and the West into a similar zero-sum game. With each side competing for influence in Ukraine and fearing that any concession or compromise equates to a loss that results in an equivalent gain for the respective opponent, the current status quo is each side鈥檚 second-best, and currently only achievable, outcome. Thus there is little likelihood of restoring the full sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine in the near future.

The nonimplementation of Minsk II will lead either to a protracted but more stable status quo situation, as has been the case with Transnistria in Moldova, or, eventually, to the recognition of the self-declared republics, as in the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. For the moment, recognition appears unlikely: the continued existence of the self-proclaimed people鈥檚 republics in eastern Ukraine gives Moscow some leverage over Kyiv. Moscow can still ensure a level of instability that limits the domestic and foreign policy choices of the Ukrainian government. Equally, there is still some prospect of the breakaway areas鈥� reintegration on terms favorable to long-term Russian influence in the country, so this volatile status quo still offers some benefits to Russia.

A more stable status quo, however, also seems a long way away. The first signs of renewed and escalating confrontation between Russia and Ukraine and between Russia and the West are already visible: Putin鈥檚 presentation of new and more sophisticated weapons, U.S. missile to Ukraine, NATO鈥檚 proclamation of Ukraine as an 鈥�,鈥� Russia鈥檚 of contracted gas supplies to Ukraine, and the West鈥檚 willingness to and dismiss diplomats following the alleged Russian assassination attempt in the UK are all ominous signs that the conflict in Ukraine is rapidly regaining an international dimension while becoming more dangerous domestically.

As Russia and the West pursue their own interests in a Cold War鈥搇ike struggle in which Ukraine is a pawn rather than a player, grave and increasing social, economic, and political costs will be imposed on the country and its people.

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